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FUTURE SOVIET STRATEGIC POSTURE

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In light of Soviet strategic priorities, assesses the likely strategic force posture of the Soviet Union, including force strength, force disposition, and mobilization capabilities.

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
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FUTURE SOVIET STRATEGIC POSTURE

SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



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FUTURE SOVIET STRATEGIC POSTURE

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August 1990

The views expressed here are those of the Soviet Army Studies Office. They should not necessarily be construed as validated threat doctrine.

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Future Soviet Strategic Posture

Strategic Requirements

The Soviet view of future war, potential threats, and possible threat scenarios generates a series of strategic requirements which must be satisfied by future Soviet military policy and doctrine, Among these are:

- 1) maintenance of a peacetime force adequate to deal with prospective threats in an initial period of war;
- 2) preparation of a force generation infrastructure capable of generating and sustaining main forces sufficient to satisfy Soviet defense needs throughout the duration of any foreseeable conflict;
- 3) development of detailed mobilization, concentration, and operational-strategic deployment plans to meet any wartime contingency;
- 4) creation of requisite command and control entities for peacetime and wartime forces;
- 5) realignment of deployment patterns (strategic echelons) to cope with all reasonable threats and permit orderly transition from peace to war;
- 6) engineer preparation of all prospective TVDs;
- 7) deployment of sufficient air defense and ABM capability to protect the nation's industry and mobilization base (PVO Strany);
- 8) development of force generation schemes, which can deal with threats short of general war (partial mobilization).

These requirements must be tailored to meet the minimum threat posed by threat variant two (demilitarized NATO), but be flexible enough to defend against any aspect of threat variant three (reduced strength NATO). It must also address all five possible cases of how hostilities might begin. Moreover, while providing for a balanced response to all possible threats, the overall Soviet strategic posture must respond to internal pressures for assisting internal economic reform by decreasing military burdens on the economy. In this respect, analogies with the 1920s situation are useful, since that period replicated many of the internal and external conditions the Soviet Union faces today and will face in the immediate future.

Military Strength

The first basic question concerns requisite levels of peacetime and wartime military strength, which should directly reflect corresponding global and regional correlation of forces. It is reasonable to postulate Soviet acceptance of peacetime and wartime military strength levels commensurate with those of its most likely wartime opponents in a general confrontation or war. In the 1920s the Soviets adhered to this policy by maintaining a peacetime force of 560,000 (or about 75 divisions), roughly equal to the strength of her two most likely opponents (Poland

(Poland Codes

and Rumania). This peacetime manning level was expandable in several stages during crisis and war to 103 and 131 divisions (or 1 to 1.5 million men) respectively, enough to deal with the two most challenging and likely threat variants. 1

Replication of this process in the 1990s would require the Soviets to maintain peacetime forces at least on a parity basis with opposing forces existing in variant 3, a reduced-scale NATO, plus other peripheral threats the Soviets may face in Asia. Wartime strength would have to correspond to the mobilized version of that threat. (Application of the late 1930s paradigm would require postulation of a threat far beyond that which exists and maintenance of a vastly larger armed force, which would contravene and rule out future arms control discussions and unnecessarily burden, if not ruin, the Soviet economy.) Actual Soviet force levels will be dictated by levels negotiated within the CFE framework and additional requirements outside the Western theater as assessed by the General Staff.

By presuming Soviet efforts to capitalize on the economies of defense in northwest or south Asia, it is reasonable to assume Soviet strength in these regions could be cut by up to 25 percent, reducing the approximately 89-division existing force to about 66.2 Force reductions in Europe under CFE could eventually be as extensive as 50 percent, reducing the 105 divisions (forward groups of forces, Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, and Kiev Military Districts) of the current first and second strategic echelons to about 52. Part or all of the remaining divisions of the current strategic reserve of 20 divisions, beefed up by transfers from the west to about 30 divisions, could then constitute either a new second strategic echelon east of the Urals or part of a new strategic reserve. Forces transferred from active status into the mobilization base would constitute the nucleus of a new strategic reserve. This overall force of between 140-150 divisions would have an overall peacetime strength of about 1.5 million. 3 By accepting a higher degree of risk in the belief that threat variant two may evolve, even more of the active strength could be subsumed into the mobilization base or into units with lower personnel manning levels (like fortified regions), for a peacetime strength of 1.0 million, manning a ground force of roughly 100-110 divisions. 4 These strength estimates accord with Soviet declarations and actions since December 1988.

The Soviets will calculate necessary wartime strength based on the assessed strength of potential foes. As a rule of thumb, however, in virtually all peacetime periods, the Soviets have assumed the necessity for expanding their force structure during wartime three- to four-fold and have created the mechanism for doing so. This would mandate a future wartime mobilized strength of about 4.5 million (as opposed to 1.5 to 2 million, men in the 1920s, 5.4 million today, and 9.0 million in 1941) and creation

of a mobilization mechanism capable of carrying out that expansion.

Armed Forces Deployment: Peacetime Disposition

Force strength is but one dimension of strategic posture. Equally important is the interrelated concept of armed forces deployment [razvertyvaniye vooruzhennykh sil'], which, in turn, depends directly on' the nature, principally geographic, of the threat. Armed forces deployment involves creation of force groupings to conduct war (operations). The point of departure for strategic deployment is the peacetime disposition of active and mobilizable forces in time of crisis and war. Currently, Soviet forces are disposed to meet threats in three strategic theaters: Western, Southern, and Far Eastern. The vast territorial expanse of these theaters precludes effective strategic command and control of all forces operating within them by a single strategic headquarters. To facilitate command and control, as in the past, the Soviets have designated specific theaters of military operations (TVDs), in which strategic forces operate.

The size, number, and even the existence of TVDs has varied in the past. In the 1920s the Western Theater (from the Arctic to the Black Sea) consisted of six TVDs, in which groups of armies operated under loose <u>front</u> control. By the late 1930s the Western Theater shrunk to include five TVDs, each of which was the responsibility of a single <u>front</u>. This system proved inadequate during the initial stages of the Second World War, and the Soviets replaced the TVDs with three strategic direction headquarters (Northwestern, Western, Southwestern), each consisting of several <u>fronts</u> responsible to a small direction [<u>napravleniye</u>] headquarters. When this arrangement also proved unsatisfactory, the Soviets shifted to use of groups of <u>fronts</u> temporarily formed to conduct strategic operations under STAVKA control (through its designated personal representative). 5

In the late 1970s the Soviets again formed TVDs, ultimately five (three in the Western Theater and one each in the Southern and Far Eastern Theaters). These suited the strategic circumstance of having groups of Soviet forces disposed deep in central Europe. Faced with the likelihood that these forward groups will return to the Soviet Union, the General Staff must reassess the nature and utility of TVDs, either as defined geographical areas or as specific strategic headquarters. Although the ultimate outcome of that redefinition is not yet clear, it is likely the Soviets will retain at least Western and Far Eastern TVDs and perhaps a skeletal organization of a Southern TVD. 6 Other former TVDs will become strategic directions.

Even more vexing for the General Staff is the matter of establishing strategic depth for its force deployments, which it

has classically achieved through echelonment. Strategic echelons, by definition, are distinct parts of the Soviet Union's armed forces designated to accomplish strategic missions in wartime. The first strategic echelon consists of forces designated to conduct initial operations, while the second echelon includes Soviet main forces located or forming in the depth of the nation. Strategic reserves under High Command control consist of additional mobilizable forces and materiel.

In the recent past and currently in the Western Theater, the forward groups of forces with their massive command and control and support infrastructures make up the first strategic echelon (see figure 1). This thirty-division force is backed up directly or indirectly by the seventy-five divisions of the border military districts (plus the Kiev Military District), which comprise the second strategic echelon, and by a strategic reserve of about twenty active divisions and an indeterminate number of mobilization divisions. 7 Similar echelonment applies to the Far East and Southern Theaters.

With the prospective withdrawal of the forward groups of forces from Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet General Staff will have lost its first strategic echelonment in the most critical theater; and must now reassess strategic echelonment in general. The most appropriate model for echelonment within the contiguous borders of the Soviet Union is that of the 1920s and 1930s, the last occasion when the Soviets were forced to address that question. At that time the first strategic echelon consisted of forces in the border military districts, and the second strategic echelon of forces in internal military districts. There are two major problems with Soviet adoption of a similar system. First, because of the likely pace of operations and range of weapons systems, the border districts may lack requisite depth to conduct successful strategic initial operations. Second, and more unsettling, the strategic echelonment system of the 1920s and 1930s failed in 1941, and the Germans overcame first strategic echelon forces within only three weeks.

One solution to this dilemma would be to seek bilateral military and political agreements with Eastern European states (such as Poland), which are uneasy with the new political structure, in particular, the unification of Germany. Such an agreement could permit the token stationing of Soviet forces on Polish soil so long as NATO retains its own military force. An even stronger version of this solution could involve continued stationing of Soviet forces in eastern Germany, even after German unification. Although this could be justified while U.S. troops are still stationed in Europe, once they returned to the U.S. such an arrangement would become increasingly awkward and destabilizing. Stationing of forces somewhere in Eastern Europe would provide additional arguments for Soviet adoption of the pre-1941 mode of strategic echelonment.




Figure 1. Strategic echelonment, 1989

There are then principally two methods for the Soviets to echelon forces strategically in peacetime. Both will be shaped by the provisions of CFE agreements. The first would involve formation of a relatively shallow first strategic echelon with limited forward basing of forces in western Poland and perhaps even a token force in eastern Germany (see figure 2). The first strategic echelon would extend eastward to the Sozh and Dnepr River lines and include the Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev, and Trans-Caucasus Military Districts. The second strategic echelon would then include portions of the Ural-Volga, Moscow, and North Caucasus Military Districts, while a strategic reserve could consist of forces in part of the Ural-Volga and the Siberian Military Districts and in the mobilization base elsewhere in the nation. Analogous echelonment would exist for the Southern and Far Eastern Theaters, although strategic echelons would not be as clearly delineated along military district lines.

A second echelonment variation would include a first strategic echelon extending eastward to the Urals, backed up by a second strategic echelon east of the Urals (see figure 3). The strategic reserve in this circumstance would encompass the mobilization base throughout the entire nation and would have no specific geographical limits.

The relative strength and force composition of strategic echelons will depend directly on overall Soviet armed forces strength and on constraints imposed by arms control negotiations. In general, the closer that reality is to threat variant 3, the stronger will be overall Soviet strength and the strength and readiness of the first strategic echelon. In this instance, Soviet dispositions could strongly resemble those of June 1941, although on a slightly lighter scale.

The general post-1945 straightening of the Soviet border will facilitate future Soviet strategic defense of her western borders. The new border configuration has eliminated the infamous Bialystok and Lvov salients and provided a far more linear front, which offers better lateral communications west of the Pripiat Marshes. This configuration will remain favorable if the Soviets retain control over the Baltic states, Belorussia, the western Ukraine, and Bessarabia. Their loss, however, would seriously jeopardize Soviet western strategic defenses.

The Soviets have already sketched out what their new reformed "defensive" force structure will look like. Its combat backbone will be new tank and motorized rifle divisions, restructured to deemphasize reliance on armor and, instead, emphasize better-balanced combined-arms entities at every level of command. Weaponry and materiel hitherto employed at division level will devolve to regiment, battalion, or army level, depending on where it will be of the greatest use. To enhance the




Figure 2. Strategio echelonment, 1995:
Variant 1




Figure 3. Strategic echelonment, 1995: Variant 2

defensive look of forces at division and below, air assault and assault bridging assets will be removed from some divisions and armies and be concentrated at <u>front</u> level. (This, of course, does not preclude reassignment and employment of these forces at lower levels in wartime.)

At least some tank divisions will convert to a square configuration of two tank and two motorized rifle regiments, and they will strongly resemble mechanized formations of yesteryear in form, if not in name. Some motorized rifle divisions will similarly adopt a square configuration of four motorized rifle regiments, each with a reduced armor complement plus a separate tank battalion. The Soviets have announced their intention to recreate machine gun-artillery formations (probably divisions) similar in structure and function to the former fortified regions (ukreplennyy rayon). Although they have associated these formations with defense in Central Asia and the Far East, it is possible they will appear in the west as well.

These formations will likely be grouped into two types of armies, each with a specific operational function to perform as part of a first strategic echelon wartime front. Combined-arms armies, composed of motorized rifle divisions, machine gun-artillery divisions, and perhaps a tank division, will operate as covering (or defensive) armies, with the mission of conducting initial defensive operations to slow and halt any enemy offensive. These armies will defend to a depth of 150 kilometers with their tank divisions poised to the rear. Tank (or mechanized) armies will deploy 150 to 300 kilometers deep to halt enemy penetrations and conduct counterstrokes. Other deeper-deployed tank armies, supplemented by mobilized reserves (secondary forces) will launch counteroffensives, if required. Thus, this structure could include both peacetime forces maintained at or near combat strength and a large mobilizable force, maintained at cadre strength in peacetime.

The strength, number, and disposition of these peacetime forces will have to be reconciled with force reduction provisions negotiated under CFE. If the force balance decreases proportionately and approaches conditions of threat variant 2, Soviet posture will also decrease in terms of overall strength and combat readiness. The bulk of reductions will probably be absorbed by the force generation system, which serves as a mobilization vehicle in the event of war.

The readiness state of peacetime forces of first strategic echelon wartime <u>fronts</u> will correspond to the perceived threat. Should a large NATO or German force exist in peacetime, all forward forces will be maintained at nearly full wartime strength. Should a residual NATO force exist in Central Europe, readiness requirements would correspondingly decrease. In this instance, elements of forward combined-arms armies in peacetime

are likely to remain near full strength, while the remainder of these armies and tank armies would be kept at cadre strength (perhaps one full-strength regiment in peacetime).

Force Generation

The second, and perhaps most critical aspect of strategic armed forces deployment is that of generating forces adequate to satisfying wartime strategic needs. Simply stated, that encompasses both manning the force in peacetime and providing sufficient manpower to effect the transition from peace to war. Although it is the subject of a second study, it warrants brief comment here.

Force generation includes three critical elements: first, establishment and maintenance of a peacetime force and, second, creation of a mechanism for expanding that force to meet wartime needs in terms of manpower, combat force structure, and materiel. Last, it is desirable, in so far as possible, to conceal full wartime strength, In the past the Soviets have employed a variety of methods to perform this critical function. 10 In simplified terms, these systems have produced the following results as regards both mobilization and demobilization: 11

	<u>Dec 1920</u>	May 1925	<u>1935</u>	<u>1 Ja</u>	n 1938	<u>Dec 1940</u>
Manpower Divisions	5.3m 78	560,000 88	1.3m 102*	1.52 142*		4.2m 206
	21 June 1	941 <u>Dec</u>	1941	<u>Dec 1943</u>	April 194	<u>5</u>
Manpower Divisions	5.0m 303	4.19 300	9 m	5.9m 480	6.2m 570	
	Jan 1948	196	<u>5</u>	1975	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>
Manpower Divisions	2.8m 170	2.0 147	m.	1.8m 166	1.9m 211	1.59m 217

^{*} includes 2 mechanized corps

Over time the Soviets have employed two basic systems for force maintenance and force mobilization during transition from peacetime to wartime. From 1924 to 1938, they relied on a mixed territorial militia/cadre system, which permitted maintenance of low peacetime strength levels, but created a large pool of trained manpower to expand the structure in the event of war. From 1938 to 1941, and after the Second World War, the Soviets relied on a regular cadre system based on universal military service. This is the system they still employ. In the regular

^{**} includes 4 tank corps

cadre system, the Soviets maintained these forces at distinct levels of cadre manning or truncated them in peacetime on the basis of one full-strength cadre regiment or brigade per division. This cadre force provided the nucleus around which the full unit could mobilize and provided additional cadre for the completely mobilized force. In addition, the Soviets have maintained in their mobilization base formations difficult to detect, such as embryonic or "mobilization" divisions, which can be quickly spun off their parent unit containing their cadre leadership.

Today the Soviets are studying these two traditional force generation schemes as well as two others—the pure territorial/militia and volunteer system, both of which are partly derived from the experiences of other nations. 12 Each system has its own strengths and weaknesses, which, when reduced to chart form, appear as follows:

Manpower	<u>Cadre</u>	Mixed	Terri	<u>torial</u>	Volunteer
Universal Military Service	Yes	Yes	,	Yes	No
Two-Three Year Service					
Obligation	Yes	Varied	j	No	Yes
Large Manpower Base	Yes	Yes		Yes	No
Formations					
Varying Strength	Yes	Yes	. ,	Yes	No
Regional Manning	No	Partially	•	Yes	Possible
All-Union Manning	Yes	Partially	1	No	Yes

Today there are fairly clear criteria the Soviets must satisfy in whatever force generation system they adopt. Some of these criteria are basic, others are transitory, but none can be violated without incurring certain risks. The five most critical criteria are: "sufficient" force available to meet peacetime need; "sufficient" rapidly mobilizable reserve force to satisfy wartime contingencies; budgetary savings vis-a-vis current force expenditures; optimal (efficient) use of scarce manpower resources, vis-a-vis the state economy; and an army which is reliable. Expressed in matrix form, the extent to which each force generation system satisfies the criteria becomes clear:

<u>Criteria</u> <u>System</u>

Cadre Mixed Cadre/Territorial Territorial/Militia

Sufficient peacetime

force Yes Yes No

Sufficient reserves (universal military

service) Yes Yes Yes

Budgetary

savings No Yes Yes

Optimal use of

manpower No Yes Yes

Reliable

army? Yes Primarily Questionable (Distasteful to Soviets) (Condemned by Soviets)

<u>Criteria</u> <u>System</u>

Volunteer

Sufficient peacetime

force Yes

Sufficient reserves (universal military service)

service) No

Budgetary

savings No

Optimal use of

manpower

Yes

Reliable

army? Yes

Judged against these criteria, the present cadre system is best suited to satisfy purely military needs, but fails to meet the short-term economic and manpower requirements of the state. In addition, as the threat environment moderates, the necessity for a large, expensive cadre system decreases. The mixed cadre/territorial system better satisfies current and future Soviet economic and military needs, but raises the question of reliability in ethnic territorial units. A purely territorial/militia system is unsatisfactory because it produces neither a large enough peacetime force nor requisite reliability. The volunteer force, which would guarantee reliability, is unsuited because of its questionable expense and the resultant lack of mobilizable reserves.

It is likely the ultimate solution the Soviets adopt will incorporate elements from all systems, plus some imaginative new measures derived from past practices. First, the Soviets would like to retain universal military service, but to do so they must solve serious problems (draft evasion, desertion, etc.). Failure to solve these problems could result in greater reliance on contract service. Force manning will probably be based on a mixed cadre/territorial structure with a heavier cadre component than existed in the 1920s. Whereas, in the 1920s the ratio of cadre to territorial divisions was roughly 3:4, in the future that ratio will be at least 2:1. In a prospective force of 150 divisions, this would result in about 100 cadre and 50 territorial divisions. Territorial formations would have some leavening of all-union command cadre and would be restricted to only nationalities considered reliable. Politically, the creation of territorial formations could have considerable appeal and bargaining value if Soviet political reforms result in some form of federal system (a pleasanter alternative than outright secession or forced retention in the Soviet Union).

The burden of maintaining a large cadre force could be mitigated by maintaining distinctly different cadre manning levels in peacetime (similar to today's categories and the "line" system of the 1920s and 30s) or by maintaining cadre nuclei (regiments or battalions) of large units and formations in peacetime. Some cadre formations could be maintained in peacetime as fortified regions, which in wartime could convert to full-fledged divisions. 13

This cadre force could be expanded in time of crisis or during wartime by pre-assignment of personnel within active cadre formations to newly formed formations, which would then be filled out with reservists, or augmentees, and stored equipment (similar to embryonic formations of the 1920s and 30s). Another means of creating new formations during mobilization would be to maintain mobilization sites and training centers in peacetime with sufficient cadre and mobilization equipment sets to form the nucleus of up to 2 new mobilization formations, which could then be filled out with reservists and conscripts. 14 Past practice indicates that a force of 100 cadre and 50 territorial formations, augmented by one training center and one mobilization

center per military district (for a total of 30) could produce between 360 and 400 division-size wartime formations, an adequate force to deal with any foreseeable threat. Whereas in the past the Soviets believed it was necessary to triple their peacetime structure in wartime, in a nuclear and high technology age a more than two-fold increase should be adequate to meet strategic requirements.

ENDNOTES

- 1. In a longer duration mobilization scenario, the Red Army could have expanded well beyond these figures to approximately Civil War strength of over 5 million.
- 2. The Soviet Union has traditionally employed fortified regions along its southern and eastern borders to fulfill defensive roles, conserve manpower, and provide a base around which mobilization could occur. During wartime the fortified regions served as economy of force formations, permitting main forces to better concentrate. During mobilization fortified regions were sometimes converted into full-fledged divisions, and the reverse occurred during demobilization.

The quantities of divisions are according to IISS The Military Balance 1989-1990. As such they incorporate none of the announced Soviet troop reductions, which to date include 4 tank divisions from Western Group of Forces and 1 each from the Central and Southern Groups. In addition, the Soviets have announced withdrawal of 3 of 4 divisions from Mongolia, 12 from Asia (facing China), and conversion of other divisions to artillery-machine gun divisions, the modern equivalent of the older fortified region.

- 3. It is likely that 140-150 divisions would be maintained at varying manning levels, depending on the international political climate, missions, and their geographical orientation.
- 4. As the threat decreases, manning levels could decrease and the Soviets could rely to a greater extent on fortified regions, mobilization divisions, and a variety of mobilization bases (existing divisions, training or mobilization centers, etc.).
- 5. In late July 1945 the Soviets created a Theater of Military Operations (TVD) headquarters under Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky to control all air, sea, and land operations against Japanese forces in Manchuria. This was necessitated by the huge size of the region of conflict, the complexity of envisioned operations, the requirement for offensive speed, and the distance of the theater from the western Soviet Union.
- 6. This is based on the assumption that the most serious threat faced by the Soviets, besides those in the West, will be threat of foreign intervention on behalf of rebellious nationalities in

Central Asia.

7. The approximate breakdown of divisions by military district and group of forces is:

<u>Group or</u> <u>Military District</u>	<u>Tank</u>	<u>Divisions</u> <u>Mot Rifle</u>	<u>Abn</u>	Total
Western Group Northern Group Central Group Southern Group	$ \begin{array}{c} 11 \\ 1 \\ 2 \\ \hline 2 \\ \hline 16 \end{array} $	8 1 3 2 14	0 0 0 <u>0</u>	19** 2** 5** <u>4</u> **
Leningrad Baltic Belorussian Carpathian Odessa Kiev	$\begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 3 \\ 10 \\ 4 \\ 0 \\ \hline 8 \\ 25 \end{array}$	11 7 2 9 9 7 45	1 2 0 0 1 0 4	12 12 12* 13 10 <u>15</u> 74
Moscow Ural-Volga	$\frac{2}{\frac{1}{3}}$	$\frac{7}{\frac{9}{16}}$	1 0 1	10 10 20
North Caucasus Trans-Caucasus Turkestan	$\begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 0 \\ \underline{1} \\ 2 \end{array}$	8 12 <u>16</u> 36	0 1 <u>0</u> 1	9 13 <u>17</u> 39
Siberian Trans-baikal Far Eastern Mongolian	0 2 3 <u>2</u> 7	$ \begin{array}{r} 8 \\ 11 \\ 21 \\ \hline 2 \\ \hline 42 \end{array} $	0 0 0 <u>0</u>	8 13* 24*** <u>4</u> **

^{*} does not include experimental "unified army" corps, each consisting of about two divisions, which have only recently been disbanded

According to The Military Balance 1989-1990 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), 28-42.

8. For example, see D. T. Yazov, "V interesakh obshchey bezopasnosti mira" [In the interest of general world security], Izvestiya, (February 27, 1989), 3.

In January 1990 at the Vienna Doctrinal meetings, the Soviet delegation stated that new motorized rifle divisions would have between 85 and 155 tanks and would be organized with 2 to 3

^{**} troop withdrawals underway

^{***} includes one coastal defense division

motorized regiments equipped with BMPs and 1 to 2 with BTRs. See Graham Turbiville, Jr., <u>Trip Report -- Seminar on Miltary Doctrine</u>, (Ft, Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 9 February 1990).

- 9. Based on the declared tank strength of 155, new Soviet motorized rifle divisions will probably contain 5 tank battalions with 31 tanks each. One battalion will be assigned to each of the four motorized rifle regiments, to employ as a single subunit or to subdivide on the basis of one tank company per each regimental motorized rifle battalion (to form a combined-arms battalion). The fifth battalion will serve as a separate tank battalion under division control (similar to the former separate tank battalion of motorized rifle divisions of forward groups of forces).
- 10. D. M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1989). The aforementioned case of the 1946 GOFG operational plan is also an example of concealing wartime force structure in peacetime.
- 11. Chart based on the following sources: Direktivy komandovaniya frontov Krasnoy Armii 1917-1922 gg. [Directives of the Red Army's front commands 1917-1922], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978); Berkhin, Voyennaya reforma; V. A. Anfilov, Proval blitskriga [The failure of blitzkrieg], (Moscow: "Nauka," 1974), 50 let Sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil (50 years of the Soviet armed forces); I. Kh. Bagramian, ed., Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva [History of war and military art], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1970), The Miltary Balance, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965, 1975, 1989).
- 12. In particular, the U.S. and British volunteer systems. The Soviet navy has begun experimenting with volunteers in selected areas of service. "Officers, Deputies Discuss Professional Military," Moscow World Service 1030 GMT 8 March 90 states "General Nikitin of the General Staff reported that the navy has already prepared an experiment in which some of the sailors will serve by contract."
- 13. The Soviets employed nuclei cadre regiments in GOFG between 1946 and 1949 and converted fortified regions into rifle divisions and vice versa in Manchuria between 1939 and 1946.
- 14. Future Czech Army mobilization plans are based on maintaining a peacetime force of ten divisions, five ready divisions at fifty to seventy percent strength and five reduced strength (cadre) divisions at ten to twenty-two percent strength. The former will be mobilizable in 2 to 3 days. The latter will form as equipment storage sites (3) or training centers (2) and can mobilize in 17 days. During mobilization five additional divisions will form as spin-offs from existing divisions, using

"second equipment sets." Thus, a peacetime force of 10 divisions can evolve after mobilization into a wartime force of 15 divisions. See Graham Turbiville, Jr., Trip Report -- Seminar on Military Doctrine, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 9 February 1990). This report contains comments made by the Czech delegation at Vienna Doctrinal discussions 22-26 January 1990. In all likelihood, the Czech system is based on similar Soviet practices.